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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Can Short Sellers Predict Accounting Restatements and Foresee Their Severity? 
(August 2004) 
Jap Efendi, B.B.A., Texas A&M University; M.S. Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael R. Kinney 
 
This dissertation investigates whether short sellers establish short positions prior 
to accounting restatement announcements and whether the levels of short interest are 
related to the severity of restatements. Using 565 firms with restatement disclosure 
during the period of 1995 to 2002 and matched control firms with no restatements 
announcements, I find that the level of short interest is higher for the sample firms 
compared to the control firms in the months surrounding the announcements. The level of 
short interest increases as the restatement announcement date approaches and declines 
thereafter. Related to severity of restatement, I find that the level of short interest in the 
pre-disclosure period is higher for restatements involving fraud and the revenue accounts. 
There exists limited evidence that the pre-disclosure level of short interest is positively 
associated with the number of quarters restated and the magnitude of the restatements. 
Finally, I find cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcements are more 
negative for restatement firms that have a higher level of short interest. These results 
suggest that short sellers are highly sophisticated investors who can see through 
accounting manipulation and consequently profit from their knowledge.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
To enjoy the advantage of a free market, one must have both buyers and sellers, 
both bulls and bears. A market without bears would be like a nation without a free 
press. There would be no one to criticize and restrain the false optimism that 
always leads to disaster  Bernard Baruch. 
 
Recent accounting restatements by prominent companies such as Enron and 
WorldCom are estimated to cost investors billions of dollars. Accounting restatements, 
which represent public acknowledgements of GAAP reporting violations or accounting 
manipulations, have tarnished the credibility of accounting practices and raised questions 
about the quality of corporate financial disclosures. The GAO (2002), under the 
instruction of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, reports an alarming rise in the number of 
restatement announcements from January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002. The report shows that 
the number of restatement announcements increased dramatically from 92 in 1997 to 225 
in 2001.   
This study empirically evaluates whether a certain group of sophisticated 
investors, in this case short sellers, can predict accounting restatements and foresee their 
severity. Understanding short sellers behavior related to accounting manipulation and 
restatement is intriguing because of the following reasons. First, unlike most investors 
who profit when prices increase, short sellers profit only when prices fall. Short sellers, 
therefore, have the motive to identify negative signals in order to predict bad news. Staley 
(1997), a professional short-seller, characterizes short sellers as very skeptical investors 
who vigorously attempt to identify firms that manipulate earnings and/or those firms that 
will restate their earnings in the future. Second, although short selling seems to be an 
                                                
This dissertation follows the style and format of The Accounting Review 
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attractive strategy for bearish investors, short selling is a risky and costly investment 
strategy. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest that short sellers must be informed 
traders who are confident about their position, and short sellers will not trade unless they 
expect the price to fall sufficiently to compensate them for the additional costs and risks 
of short selling. Kinney and McDaniel (1989), Feroz et al. (1991), Palmorse et al (2004), 
and GAO (2002) document an average of 10 percent cumulative abnormal return in 
days surrounding restatement announcements. A negative return of this size should 
provide plenty of incentive for short sellers to target restatement firms. Finally, the 
business press provides anecdotal evidence that short sellers have the ability to identify 
firms that manipulated their financial numbers and profit when the stock prices drop. To 
date, however, empirical evidence that short sellers target firms involved in accounting 
manipulation is scant.1     
Using 565 firms with restatement announcements in January 1995 to June 2002 
and paired control firms matched on industry and size, I evaluate whether the level of 
short interest in the months surrounding restatement announcements is higher for sample 
firms compared to control firms.2 I find that the paired difference in the level of short 
interest increases from 0.5 percent to over 1.0 percent from the 12th month prior to the 
month of restatement announcements. Subsequently, the paired difference in the level of 
short interest decreases to 0.4 percent in the 12th month after restatement announcements. 
The results remain consistent in the multivariate regression settings that control for 
monthly-paired differences in prices and book-to-market ratios. Further, I find that the 
                                                
1 Short sellers sophistication with regards to accounting manipulation is intriguing. Unlike insiders, 
institutional investors, or analyst who have inside connections, short sellers are independent and disliked by 
management (Gasparino 2002; Schwartz 1998). 
2 Level of short interest is the number of common shares shorted divided by the number of common shares 
outstanding. It is also known as percentage of short interest outstanding. 
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level of short interest increases in the months leading up to restatement announcements 
and declines thereafter.  
I also investigate whether the level of short interest is related to the severity of the 
accounting restatement  to my knowledge, there is no study that links short sellers with 
the severity of accounting manipulation. I evaluate the levels of short interest for different 
types of restatement severity with univariate statistics as well as multivariate models that 
control for transaction costs related to short selling. Analysis within the restatement firms 
shows that the level of short interest in the pre-announcement period is significantly 
higher for firms restating revenue accounts and for restatements involving fraud. In 
addition, there is marginal evidence that the pre-announcement level of short interest is 
positively associated with the number of quarters restated and the magnitude of the 
restatements. Finally, I find that cumulative abnormal returns in days surrounding the 
announcements are more negative for restatement firms that have a higher level of short 
interest. In summary, the evidence indicates that short sellers have the ability to anticipate 
and, to a certain extent, foresee the severity of accounting restatement, and short sellers 
use their understanding about accounting restatement to profit accordingly. 
The results of this study should be of interest to the business community as well 
as to regulators because the results show that short sellers are highly sophisticated with 
regards to misstated accounting reports. I provide some answers to Jensens (2004) 
concern about the inability of short sellers to eliminate the agency costs of overvalued 
equity.3 First, although my findings show that short sellers can identify firms that restate 
                                                
3 Jensen (2004) points out that neither control markets nor equity-based compensation can solve the agency 
costs of overvalued equity. He is puzzled that short selling was unable to resolve the problem; hence, it 
appears that the only solution to the problems lies in the board of directors and governance systems. 
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their earnings, which represent the extreme cases of accounting manipulations,4 it appears 
that the market disregards or underreacts to the levels and changes in short interest.5 
Perhaps investors, auditors, and regulators should pay closer attention to short sellers 
activities because this study shows that firms involved in accounting manipulation have a 
significantly higher level of short interest compared to firms that do not manipulate their 
financial numbers.6 Second, high transaction costs associated with short selling may have 
impeded the contribution of short selling to the pricing efficiency of the equities markets. 
Short sellers would be unwilling to take a position when the expected transaction costs 
outweigh the expected price drop; therefore, they act only in the most severe cases. 
Although this study shows that short sellers establish positions in firms that manipulated 
their accounting numbers, Richardson (2003) does not find that short sellers take 
positions in firms with high accruals that may be involved in aggressive earnings 
management. These combined findings suggest that short sellers will not act when the 
expected profit is not large enough  that is, when the assessed probability and/or the 
possible price drop (outcome) are relatively low. The fact that short sellers do not short 
when misspricing is not sufficiently large should cause the SEC to be concerned because 
this behavior impedes pricing efficiency. In 1999, the SEC has shown its intention to 
reduce short selling transaction costs and issued a Concept Release asking for public 
                                                
4 An accounting restatement is an extreme case of accounting manipulation because management is caught 
and forced to acknowledge the wrongdoing. Often times, the news is followed by resignation or dismissal 
of company executives. 
5 This fact is not entirely unusual considering numerous research finding that the market or certain market 
participants are overly optimistic and they are surprised when the facts or bad news are revealed (Sloan 
1996; Bradshaw et al. 2001; Richardson et al. 2001; Griffin 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004) It is also possible 
that investors are gambling on the price momentum (bubble) and speculating that they wont be the last 
owner when the bubble bursts. The most difficult part is to determine when the bubble will burst.  
6 Any information that helps to reveal earnings manipulation sooner is valuable because it prevents further 
losses and destruction of a firms core value. Jensen (2004) estimates that at its peak value, Enrons worth 
was approximately 30 billion dollars. However, prolonged manipulation finally wiped out the entire value 
of the company. 
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comments to relax short selling regulations.7 Last but not least, short sellers may be 
unable to solve the overvalued equity problem because they are simply unable to 
decipher or understand the degree of certain accounting manipulations due to limited 
information. Management may purposely eliminate or obfuscate items in financial 
statements to cover up their wrongdoings.8 Additionally, when restatement occurs, the 
amount restated may not truly represent the extent of the manipulation because 
management may have the motive to under-acknowledge the problems in order to reduce 
negative consequences. When this happens, short sellers would benefit less than if all the 
wrongdoings were revealed.      
The next section of this dissertation provides a literature review of short selling.  
Section three develops the hypotheses. Section four discusses data and sample selection. 
Section five elaborates on the research design. Section six presents the results. Finally, 
section seven suggests ideas for future studies and concludes the study. For those who are 
interested in the history of short selling, Appendix A provides a narrative on the 
development of short selling from the early European markets to the present.  
                                                
7 The SEC adopted Rule 10a-1 (Short sale rule) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at a time when 
securities markets had less trading volume and simpler trading strategies than current markets. Since then, 
securities trading has increased drastically in volume, velocity, and complexity. There have also been 
substantial improvements in market transparency and surveillance mechanisms. However, the SEC remains 
cautious about potentially abusive use of short selling. 
8 For example, Enron provided cryptic disclosures regarding various related-party transactions in its Form 
10-K as well as the quarterly form 10-Q.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Institutional Information on Short Selling 
In the capital market, the conventional approach to making a profit is to buy low 
and sell high. However, it is also possible to make a profit in the reverse order  sell high 
and buy low. Short selling is selling a security that the seller does not own by borrowing 
it from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor. Short selling is important because it 
contributes to the pricing efficiency of the equities markets. Efficient markets require that 
prices fully reflect all buy and sell interest. Investors who believe a stock is overvalued 
may engage in short selling in an attempt to profit from a perceived divergence of prices 
from true economic values. They add to stock pricing efficiency because the transactions 
inform the market of their evaluation of future stock price performance. 
Although short selling seems to be an attractive trading strategy for bearish 
investors, it is a high-risk investment strategy because it is more costly compared to long 
selling (selling securities that the seller owned) for the following reasons. First, the 
potential loss from short selling is unlimited (Tauli 2003, 45). While the maximum gain 
from short selling is limited to the price of the security (maximum profit is generated 
when the price falls to zero), the maximum loss from short selling is theoretically 
unlimited because there is no limit to how high the price may rise. Second, short sellers 
may be forced to purchase replacement shares if the lenders of the borrowed shares 
demand repayment and there are no other shares to borrow (Tauli 2003, 47). Worse come 
to worst, short sellers can be caught in a short squeeze when they are forced to cover 
the short position to limit their losses as the prices rise sharply and their efforts to buy 
back the stock leads to further increases in share price (Tauli 2003, 49). Third, the up-
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tick rule makes short selling difficult because it allows short selling only when the price 
of the stock is not lower than the last transaction and the last price movement was upward 
(Tauli 2003, 51). The SEC established the up-tick rule in 1934 fearing that short selling 
can cause the market to spiral down. The fourth cost results from the tax treatment. Short 
selling profit is taxed as a short-term capital gain no matter how long the position is held 
(Dechow et al. 2001, 80). Finally, there is a high margin requirement to borrow stocks. 
Most brokers require a 50 percent margin of the borrowed stock in the traders account to 
establish a short sale position and a margin call is triggered when the value of the account 
falls to 30 percent (Epstein 1995). All these factors related to short selling make it a 
heavily regulated and risky trading strategy. Since short selling is riskier and more 
expensive than establishing a long position, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest that 
short sellers must be informed traders who are confident about their positions, and short 
sellers will not trade unless they expect the price to fall enough to compensate them for 
the high costs and risks of short selling. 
 Staley (1997), in her book The Art of Short Selling, calls short sellers the alter 
ego of Wall Street. She describes short sellers as very skeptical investors who target 
companies with problems that might cause major income reversals or bankruptcies. Short 
sellers target primarily those companies whose managers lie to investors and/or those 
companies with tremendously inflated stock prices (bubble stocks). Weis (2002) states 
that short sellers have an important role to curb hype and manipulation. Recent business 
press provides anecdotal evidence that short sellers have the motives and the ability to 
identify firms that manipulate their accounting numbers (Staley 1997; Tauli 2003). For 
instance, Jim Chanos, an expert in short selling, had been shorting Enron shares heavily 
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before the shares fell because he was able to see major problems in the company financial 
reports (Low and McGee 2001). In congressional testimony in February 2002, Chanos 
attributed the fundamentals of his success to industrial knowledge and rigorous 
examination of financial statements (SEC 2003). 
In order to identify firms that manipulate their financial numbers, Staley (1997) 
reports that short sellers rigorously evaluate many aspects of the companies, among 
others, quality of earnings, quality of assets, quality of management, and competition. 
They carefully evaluate financial and non-financial information including information 
about managers, boards of directors, and industry information. In addition to using 
publicly available data as the basis for their research, short sellers accumulate private 
information, for example, by calling customers and suppliers to validate their suspicions. 
Related Research 
 The earlier literature in finance shows inconclusive evidence on the relationship 
between levels of short interest and future returns (Bhattacharya and Gallinger 1991; 
Choie and Hwang 1994; Figlewski 1981; Senchack and Starks 1993; Vu and Caster 
1987; Woolridge and Dickinson 1994).9 Nevertheless, recent studies using improved 
methodology show that the level of short interest is negatively associated with returns 
(Desai et al. 2002; Asquith and Muelbrook 1995). Dechow et al. (2001) show that short 
sellers identify overpriced securities using information contained in fundamental-to-price 
ratios (book-to-market ratio, etc.) and that they are less likely to short firms with high 
short selling transaction costs. Dechow et al. (2001), however, find that short sellers are 
                                                
9 One perspective argues that since short selling is costly, short sales by liquidity traders are less likely. If 
informed traders are more likely to sell short, then a high level of short interest conveys adverse 
information, implying a negative relationship between short interest and stock returns. On the other hand, 
many investors on Wall Street believe that short interest is a bullish signal because it represents latent 
demand, which will transform eventually into actual purchase of the shares to cover the short position. 
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highly sophisticated investors because they use information beyond fundamental-to-price 
ratios to distinguish if low fundamental-to-price ratios are attributed to temporarily low 
fundamentals or temporarily high prices. 
 The first test in my study is related to the findings in Dechow et al. (1996) and 
Griffin (2004). Dechow et al. (1996) investigate causes and consequences of earnings 
manipulation using 92 firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission for alleged violation of GAAP from 1982 to 1992. 
Comparing sample firms with industry-and size-matched control firms, they find that the 
motivation for earnings manipulation is to attract external financing at low cost. The 
likelihood of earnings manipulation is systematically related to weakness in the oversight 
of management. They document that the consequences of the wrongdoings, among 
others, are higher levels of short interest for firms subject to enforcement actions 
compared to control firms beginning from 2 months before up to 6 months after 
announcements of accounting manipulation. However, Dechow et al. (1996) use only 28 
sample and 33 control firms to study the levels of short interest. Their sample differs 
from mine in two additional aspects. First, the number of AAERs issued by the SEC is 
limited due to SEC resource constraints.10 My sample is more extensive because it 
includes announcements initiated by management and auditors, as well as regulators. 
Second, I study restatements announced from January 1995 to June 2002. This time 
period is certainly more appealing because management experienced tremendous 
                                                
10 Due to an increase in workloads and limited staffing, the SEC was selective about the cases it pursued.  
The SEC takes into account the seriousness of the wrongdoing, the probability of success, and the message 
the case would deliver to the industry and the public. As a consequence, firms receiving AAERs are 
involved in either more severe cases of manipulation or clustered in certain types of wrongdoings (for 
example revenue recognition or IPRD adjustment). 
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pressures to meet their earnings targets and, consequently, the number of accounting 
restatements increased significantly during this period. 
Griffin (2004) examines the responses of First Call financial analysts to the 
announcements of a corrective disclosure that gave rise to a class action lawsuit.11 He 
compares their responses to the responses of other informed investor groups, including 
short sellers. He observes that the level of short interest increases in months leading up to 
the restatement announcements. Rather than observing only the level of short interest for 
the firms announcing corrective disclosure, I implement a matched pair design that 
controls for year, month, size, and industry. Dechow et al. (2001) and Brent et al. (1990) 
point out that there are systematic changes in the level of short interest across months and 
years. Additionally, levels of short interest are affected by firm size (liquidity) and 
industry (Table 3 shows that firms in some industries have a higher propensity to 
announce restatements). In summary, my first test extends Dechow et al. (1996) and 
Griffin (2004) primarily by increasing the sample size and improving the methodology 
respectively. 
Further, this study documents that short sellers not only have the knowledge about 
the existence of accounting manipulations, but also, to some extent, the knowledge about 
the severity of the manipulations. These findings offer a novel insight into the degree of 
short sellers sophistication on accounting manipulations. Finally, I provide direct 
evidence that short sellers use their knowledge about accounting manipulations to take 
larger position in firms that will experience larger price declines. I find restatement firms 
                                                
11 Griffin (2004) explains that not all earnings restatements are followed by class action litigations. He 
indicates that the market responds more severely to a corrective disclosure related with class action 
litigation than a corrective disclosure without class action litigation. Cumulative abnormal returns over 
days (1,0,1) are 8.69 percent and 6.56 percent respectively. 
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with level of short interest in the top quartile suffer greater negative abnormal returns 
compared to their counterparts in the bottom quartile in the days surrounding restatement 
announcements.  
In a broader context, my study is related to past studies on understanding and the 
behavior of various market participants with regards to earnings management or 
manipulation. Some studies evaluating analyst behavior show that analysts tend to be 
optimistically biased in their review and forecasts. Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 
(2001) show that analyst earnings forecasts do not incorporate the predictable future 
earnings declines associated with high accruals. Griffin (2004) suggests that analysts do 
not anticipate accounting restatements that lead federal class action law suits; he finds 
analysts downgrade firms, revise earnings forecasts, and drop coverage in the month of 
corrective disclosure but not in the months prior to restatements. This pattern indicates 
that analysts simply react to the news rather than predict it. According to Griffin (2004), 
analysts may be reluctant to reveal bad news for some of the following reasons. They 
may fear that unraveling bad news will cost them access to management information in 
the future. In addition, a conflict of interest between analysts research and investment 
banking roles may cause analysts to fear that their companies would lose the investment 
banking business if the bad news is revealed.  
On the contrary, Griffin (2004) documents increasing net insider sales 
transactions, increasing level of short interest, and decreasing percentage of institutional 
ownership in the months leading up to the restatement announcements. His finding 
suggests that these informed investors have some understanding about accounting 
manipulations and subsequent restatements. By nature, insiders have the information 
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about the companys practices. It is no surprise that institutional investors are also 
knowledgeable about the problems because of their close relationship with the company. 
However, compared to the behavior of other market participants, the behavior of short 
sellers provides a more interesting setting for the following two reasons. First, short 
sellers are generally independent and are typically disliked by analysts and corporate 
insiders. For example, Solomon Smith Barneys Jack Grubman publicly attacked a short 
seller who criticized their banking client by stating that short sellers lack an 
understanding of the communication industry (Gasparino 2002). McGough (1991) 
describes short sellers and the chief executive of the company being shorted as natural 
enemies. For instance, Michael Sayer, the CEO of Microstrategy, wrote letters to 
shareholders and advised them on how to make it more difficult for short sellers to 
borrow Microstrategy shares (Tauli 2003). Further, there are reports that short sellers 
have been physically ejected from meetings by angry company management (Schwartz 
1998). Unlike analysts, short sellers have to put their money where their mouths are and 
they have to incur relatively greater transaction costs compared to other investors.  
Richardson (2003) examines short sellers abilities to process (financial) 
information. He evaluates whether short sellers understand earnings quality information 
impounded in accruals by testing whether discretionary accruals are associated with the 
level of short interest. Since abnormally high discretionary accruals are commonly used 
as a surrogate for aggressive earnings management, in a broader context, his study can be 
viewed as testing whether short sellers can decipher accounting manipulations. 
Consistent with Sloan (1996) he finds that high-accrual firms have lower future stock 
returns. However, he finds no evidence that short sellers trade based on earnings quality 
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information contained in discretionary accruals.12 Recently, researchers are starting to use 
accounting restatements in their studies (Myers et al. 2003; Raghunandan et al. 2003; 
Agrawal and Chadha 2003; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Efendi, 
Srivastava, and Swanson. 2004). Rather than relying on accruals, I use restatement 
announcements as a proxy for earnings manipulations. Earnings restatements provide 
more concrete evidence of accounting manipulations because an earnings restatement is a 
public acknowledgment that a firm has violated GAAP reporting. Moreover, there are 
some technical concerns about using accruals as a surrogate for earnings manipulation. 
McNichols (2000) shows that accruals are often correlated with long-term growth; hence, 
high-growth companies may be erroneously classified as earnings manipulators. In 
addition, Hribar and Collins (2002) warn that accruals, particularly those estimated using 
a balance sheet approach, are potentially contaminated by measurement errors.    
                                                
12 Sloan (1996) reports that taking a short position in the highest accrual decile portfolio generates only 5.7 
percent annual cumulative abnormal returns. The returns may not be sufficient to compensate short sellers 
for the risks and transaction costs they take to establish the short position.  
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III. HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 The question of whether investors can decipher accounting manipulations is of 
great interest to both academicians and capital market participants. Capital market studies 
suggest that, in general, the market cannot see through accounting manipulations. The 
significant negative abnormal returns observed surrounding the restatement 
announcements indicates that the market is surprised by the revelation of GAAP 
violations (Dechow et al. 1996, Kinney and McDaniel 1989). Short sellers are more 
sophisticated than other investors with regard to bad news because they profit from large 
security price drops. General Accounting Office  (GAO 2002), Palmorse et al. (2004), 
and Feroz et al. (1991) document that accounting restatements result in approximately a 
negative 10 percent cumulative abnormal return surrounding the restatement 
announcements and approximately a negative 30 percent cumulative abnormal return 
over a one year period.  In order to benefit from the large price declines associated with 
restatements, short sellers have the incentive to identify these firms a priori. I expect 
restatement firms will have a higher level of short interest compared to the control firms 
and that the difference in the level of short interest will rise in months prior to corrective 
disclosures. Higher levels of short interest indicate that there is a greater consensus 
among short sellers and that the short sellers are more confident about the existence of 
accounting manipulation. 
H1a: Levels of short interest are higher for sample firms compared to control 
firms in months prior to restatements 
H1b:  The difference in the level of short interest between restatement and control 
firms increases as the restatement date approaches 
 15
 Restatements represent a continuum of GAAP violation with different nature and 
type of violation involved. One way to classify GAAP violation is whether the financial 
misstatement is a result of errors and fraud.13 Statements of Auditing Standards (SAS) 
No. 53 defines errors as unintentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or 
disclosures in financial statements. Errors can result from mistakes in gathering or 
processing accounting data, incorrect accounting estimates arising from misinterpretation 
of facts or misunderstanding of complex GAAP rules (e.g., calculation of In Process 
Research and Development cost). On the other hand, SAS No. 53 defines fraud as 
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial 
statements. Examples of fraud include intentional misapplication of GAAP to change the 
timing of revenue recognition, or alteration, falsification or manipulation of the 
accounting records from which financial statements are prepared such as recording 
fictitious sales. Palmrose et al. (2004) report that restatement firms associated with fraud 
suffer greater price drops than those with no fraud. Consistently, Staley (1997) reports 
that short sellers primarily target firms that are involved in fraudulent accounting. In fact, 
many of the major recent corporate frauds such as Enron, Tyco, Sunbeam, and ZZZZ 
Best were first exposed by short sellers. If short sellers have a higher motivation and the 
ability to identify firms involved in fraud; I, therefore, expect the levels of short interest 
in months prior to restatements to be higher for restatement firms that have indications of 
fraud compared to restatement firms with no indications of fraud. 
                                                
13 Generally the terms irregularity and fraud can be used interchangeably. Technically, a distinction can 
be drawn between irregularity and fraud. An irregularity is an intentional misstatement in financial 
statements. An irregularity evolves into fraud only when financial statements are shown to another, who 
then justifiably relies on them to his or her detriment (Young 2002, 4). 
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H2a: Pre-announcement levels of short interest are higher for restatement firms 
with fraud indications than restatement firms with no fraud indications 
 Restatements can also be classified according to the accounts restated. Palmrose 
and Scholz (2004) examine the relationship between types of accounts restated and the 
probability of auditor litigation. They classify restatements as either economic or 
technical. Economic restatements involve transactions and accounts related to core 
(recurring) earnings, such as revenue, cost of goods sold, and operating expense 
(including depreciation). Other restatements, such as adjustments to intangible assets and 
in process R&D write-offs are classified as technical. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find 
that auditors are more likely to be sued in cases of economic restatements. More 
importantly, Palmrose et al. (2004) and Anderson and Yohn (2002) find that firms 
restating core or revenue accounts suffer greater price declines because they convey 
negative information about the future prospect of the company. If short sellers have a 
higher motivation and the ability to identify firms manipulating core (revenue) accounts, 
I expect the levels of short interest in the months prior to restatement announcements to 
be higher for firms restating core accounts compared to firms restating other accounts. 
H2b: Levels of short interest are higher for firms that restate core (revenue) 
accounts compared to those that restate non-core accounts 
 Another important factor that affects market reaction to corrective disclosures is 
the materiality of the restatement. The more material is the restatement, the greater it 
affects investors estimates of current and future profitability and, therefore, firm value. 
Consequently, Palmrose et al. (2004) document that materiality of the restatement is 
positively associated with the price decline. Two proxies for estimating the materiality of 
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the restatement are the number of quarters restated and the restatement magnitude, which 
is calculated as the amount restated divided by total assets. If short sellers are able to 
foresee the materiality of forthcoming restatements then the levels of short interest should 
be higher for more material restatements. 
H2c: The level of short interest is positively associated with the number of 
quarters restated 
H2d: The level of short interest is positively associated with the magnitude of 
restatement 
 The main motivation for short selling is to profit from the security price drop. 
Desai et al. (2002) and Dechow et al. (2001) document that, in general, one-year returns 
are negatively associated with the level of short interest, indicating that profit generated 
from short selling is positively associated with short sellers confidence to short the 
shares. However, I am not aware of any study that examines the relationship between 
level of short interest and returns for a sample of restatement firms. I expect restatement 
firms with higher levels of short interest to suffer more pronounced negative abnormal 
returns surrounding the restatement announcements compared to firms with lower levels 
of short interest.  
 H3: Abnormal returns surrounding the restatement announcements are more 
negative for restatement firms with higher levels of short interest  
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IV.  DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
 
I obtained monthly short interest data from the AMEX, Nasdaq, and New York 
Stock Exchange. The short interest variable used in my analysis is the level of short 
interest: the number of common shares shorted divided by the total number of common 
shares outstanding. These numbers are reported as of the middle of the month. The 
releases are published monthly by, among others, The Wall Street Journal, Barrons, and 
The New York Times. In addition, I obtained financial and monthly stock returns data 
from the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases.  
The sample comprises firms that announced restatements from January 1995 to 
June 2002. I obtain 919 restatement announcements from January 1997 to June 2002 
from the GAO Report (2003) titled Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market 
Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges.14 The GAO report excludes 
restatements that result from normal corporate activity or simple presentation issues and 
includes only restatements that were not fairly presented with GAAP. I also identify an 
additional sample of restatement firms for 1995 and 1996 using Lexis-Nexis Business 
Wire and News Wire by conducting search on keywords restat, revis, adjust, 
amend or error combined with keyword financial. Consistent with the GAO report, 
I remove restatements due to normal corporate activity or simple presentation issues. The 
1995 and 1996 searches identify an additional 167 announcements, bringing the total 
announcements to 1,086. As presented in Panel A of Table 1, I delete 322 announcements 
                                                
14 Although the announcements are termed as restatement announcements by the GAO, some of the 
disclosures are initial indications of accounting manipulations such as SEC probes. In this study, I relied on 
the GAO term and refer to these disclosures as restatement announcements. The GAO report (2002) shows 
an alarming increase in the percentage of companies restating their financial statements from 0.89 percent 
in 1997 to 2.95 percent in 2002.    
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because the firms are not covered by the Compustat database. Further, I eliminate 68 
announcements because the firms do not have adequate financial data in Compustat. 
Finally, I delete 131 observations with no short interest data because these firms are listed 
outside of AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE. Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution by 
year of the final 565 restatement announcements used in this study.  
Panel A of Table 2 illustrates the distribution of restatements by the type of 
restatement according to the classification method provided by the 2002 GAO Report. Of 
the 565 observations in the sample, the most common type of restatement is related to 
revenue with 235 occurrences (approximately 42 percent of the sample). The next most 
common type of restatement is related to expenses with 88 cases (approximately 16 
percent of the sample). Panel B of Table 2 shows that nearly 90 percent of the firms 
restated two-years or less of accounting information. There are only a few cases where 
the number of periods restated exceeds five years.   
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: Sample Generation 
Description Number 
Restatement cases from GAO report (Jan 1997 - June 2002) 919 
Hand collected restatements (1995-1996) 167 
Firms not reported in the Compustat database -322 
Firms with incomplete Compustat data -68 
Firms with no short interest data (not listed in AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE) -131 
Final sample used in the analysis 565 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Restatement Sample by Year 
 
Sample Firms with 
Available Data  
Year Frequency Percent 
1995 29 5.1% 
1996 28 5.0% 
1997 40 7.1% 
1998 50 8.8% 
1999 90 15.9% 
2000 101 17.9% 
2001 143 25.3% 
2002-July 84 14.9% 
  565 100.0% 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Distribution 
 
Panel A: Distribution by Types of Restatement 
Type Frequency Percent 
Revenue 235 41.6% 
Expenses 88 15.6% 
Restructuring, Asset and Intangibles 58 10.3% 
Others 39 6.9% 
Securities 34 6.0% 
Merger & Acquisition 27 4.8% 
IPR&D 23 4.1% 
Reclassification 17 3.0% 
Unspecified 14 2.5% 
Related Party 12 2.1% 
Loan Loss 11 1.9% 
Tax Related 7 1.2% 
Total 565 100.0% 
 
Panel B: Distribution by Number of Quarters Restated 
Quarters Restated Frequency   Frequency % 
Cumulative 
Frequency % 
1 86   17.55% 17.55% 
2 39   7.96% 25.51% 
3 47   9.59% 35.10% 
4 147   30.00% 65.10% 
5 22   4.49% 69.59% 
6 21   4.29% 73.88% 
7 31   6.33% 80.20% 
8 43   8.78% 88.98% 
9 4   0.82% 89.80% 
10 5   1.02% 90.82% 
11 7   1.43% 92.24% 
12 17   3.47% 95.71% 
13 3   0.61% 96.33% 
14 4   0.82% 97.14% 
15 1   0.20% 97.35% 
16 3   0.61% 97.96% 
17 1   0.20% 98.16% 
18 1   0.20% 98.37% 
19 1   0.20% 98.57% 
20 5   1.02% 99.59% 
22 1   0.20% 99.80% 
26 1   0.20% 100.00% 
 
Notes: 
The classification of the restatement types follows the GAO Report 2002. 
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Table 3 displays the distribution of restatement announcements by two-digit SIC 
code. A large number of the cases is concentrated in the following industries: Business 
services (15.9 percent), industrial, commercial machinery, computer equipment (7.8 
percent), electronic, other electrical equipment (7.4 percent), depository institutions 
(7.1percent), measurement instruments, photo goods, and watches (6.9 percent), and 
chemical and allied products (6.4 percent).  
A paired control firm is selected by matching the industry and the size of each 
sample firm in the fiscal year before the restatement announcement. First, I remove the 
sample firms from the pool of potential control firms. If more than one control firm is 
identified for a specific year and two-digit industry code, then the firm with the lowest 
absolute difference in total assets is selected as the matched paired control firm.  
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics comparing restatement and control firms. 
These two groups of firms do not differ in term of total assets and sales, indicating an 
effective size control in the matching process. The differences in price, book value, 
market value, book-to-market value, operating ROA, and debt ratio between the two 
groups are statistically insignificant. Restatement firms ROA is 2.1 percent lower 
compared to the control firms; the difference is significant at p-value 0.041. Kinney and 
McDaniel (1989) find that restatement firms have a poorer performance history compared 
to control firms. Dividend yield is marginally higher for control firms with a p-value of 
0.119.   
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TABLE 3 
Distribution of Sample Restatement Firms by 2-Digit Industry Code 
 
SIC DESCRIPTION FREQ % FREQ 
10 Metal Mining 4 0.7% 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 9 1.6% 
14 Mining, Quarry Nonmetal Minerals 1 0.2% 
16 Bldg Construction and General Contractor 3 0.5% 
20 Food and Kindred Products 17 3.0% 
22 Textile Mill Products 1 0.2% 
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 2 0.4% 
24 Lumber and Wood Products 3 0.5% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 2 0.4% 
26 Paper and Allied Products 5 0.9% 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Products 7 1.2% 
28* Chemicals and Allied Products 36 6.4% 
29 Petroleum Refining & Related Industries 4 0.7% 
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 7 1.2% 
31 Leather and Leather Products 2 0.4% 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete Products 3 0.5% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 6 1.1% 
34 Fabricated Metal, Excluding Machinery and Transportation Equipments 4 0.7% 
35* Industrial, Commercial Machinery, Computer Equipment 44 7.8% 
36* Electronic, Other Electrical Equipments, Excluding Computers 42 7.4% 
37 Transportation Equipment 8 1.4% 
38* Measurement Inst, Photo Gds, Watches 39 6.9% 
39 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 5 0.9% 
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehouse 3 0.5% 
45 Transportation By Air 1 0.2% 
47 Transportation Services 1 0.2% 
48 Communications 10 1.8% 
49 Electric, Gas, Sanitary Service 18 3.2% 
50 Durable Goods-Wholesale 10 1.8% 
51 Nondurable Goods-Wholesale 8 1.4% 
52 Bldg Material, Hardware, Garden 1 0.2% 
53 General Merchandise Store 6 1.1% 
54 Food Stores 4 0.7% 
55 Auto Dealers, Gas Stations 1 0.2% 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 12 2.1% 
57 Home Furniture & Equip Store 11 1.9% 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 2 0.4% 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 9 1.6% 
60* Depository Institutions 40 7.1% 
61 Non-depository Credit Institution 5 0.9% 
62 Security & Commodity Brokers 9 1.6% 
63 Insurance Carriers 15 2.7% 
64 Insurance Agents, Broker & Service 1 0.2% 
65 Real Estate 3 0.5% 
67 Holding, Other Investment Offices 16 2.8% 
70 Hotels, Other Lodging Places 3 0.5% 
72 Personal Services 1 0.2% 
73* Business Services 90 15.9% 
78 Motion Pictures 5 0.9% 
79 Amusement, Recreation 3 0.5% 
80 Health Services 5 0.9% 
82 Educational Services 6 1.1% 
83 Social Services 1 0.2% 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
SIC DESCRIPTION FREQ % FREQ 
87 Engineering, Accounting, and Mgmt Related Services 9 1.6% 
99 Nonclassifiable Establishment 2 0.4% 
    565 100.0% 
 
Notes: 
* indicates a 2-digit industry where percentage frequency of restatement announcements exceeds 
5 percent. Later, if a firm belongs to any of these 2-digit industries, it is classified as belonging to 
a high restatement industry and has a HIDNUM dummy variable of 1. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Restatement and Control Firms 
 
    Restatement Firms Control Firms Difference t-test 
    Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median p-value 
Total Assets  2,400.74 272.14 2,456.85 299.69 -56.11 0.33 0.4317
Sales  2,459.64 258.12 2,301.07 248.81 158.57 11.68 0.3907
Price  21.37 14.25 20.88 15.69 0.49 -0.94 0.7081
Book Value 189.85 2.16 223.71 7.29 -33.87 -0.09 0.3329
Market Value 3,327.51 296.92 4,499.68 336.85 -1172.17 -7.55 0.2921
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.12 0.01 0.15 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.4085
Dividend Yield 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1188
ROA  -0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.0406
Operating ROA 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.2111
Debt Ratio 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.2433
 
Notes: 
Descriptive statistics provide information about restatement and control firms in the year prior to 
restatement announcements. The following information lists the variable names in the descriptive 
statistics table and the corresponding data item numbers in the annual Compustat database. Total 
assets (data item 6); Sales (data item 12); Price = Fiscal year end closing price (data item 199); 
Book value = Deferred tax & investment tax credit (data item 35) + Common stock (data item 
85); Market value = Common shares outstanding (data item 25) x Fiscal year end closing price 
(data item 199); Book-to-market ratio = Book value / Market value; Dividend yield = Dividend 
per share (data item 25) /Fiscal year end closing price (data item 199) ; ROA = Net income (data 
item 172) / Total assets (data item 6); Operating ROA = Operating income before depreciation 
(data item 13) / Total assets (data item 6); Debt ratio = Total long term debt (data item 9) / Total 
assets (data item 6).  
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V. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
Restatement vs. Paired Match Control Firms 
To test the first hypothesis, I use a matched pair design controlling for year, 
month, size, and industry.15 Matching by year is important because Brent et al. (1990) 
and Dechow et al. (2001) show that the proportion of shares held short (level of short 
interest) has increased from the 1970s to the early 1990s, perhaps due to the growth in 
hedge funds and the deregulation of the capital market. Figure 1 shows a similar pattern 
as reported in prior studies. It illustrates that the mean level of short interest for the 
combined exchanges quadrupled from 0.50 percent in 1988 to over 2.10 percent in 2002. 
Further, controlling for month is important because Brent et al. (1990) document a 
systematic increase in level of short interest in December followed by a decline in 
January. They speculate that level of short interest increases at the end of the year as 
investors attempt to delay tax recognition of gains or losses, and level of short interest 
subsequently declines as investors reverse their short positions by covering it with their 
own shares. Table 5 indicates that drop in level of short interest between December and 
January is significantly higher compared to the change in other months. Level of short 
interest, on average, drops by 13.06 percent from the December to January period. 
Furthermore, each of the 15 annual periods consistently shows a decline in level of short 
interest. Changes in level of short interest are positive for the other months but some 
changes are neither statistically significant nor consistent across years. I include a control 
for size because Dechow et al. (2001) show that size (a proxy for liquidity) affects the 
cost of short selling; therefore, it influences the level of short interest. Transaction costs 
                                                
15 A matched pair design has been used in study of firm performance such as Kinney and Wempe (2002) 
and Efendi, Kinney, and Smith (2003). 
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are lower for more liquid stocks because these stocks are easier to borrow and less likely 
to be subject to a short squeeze. I also include an industry control because Table 3 shows 
that restatements tend to be concentrated in certain industries.  
 To examine if the difference in level of short interest changes in the months 
leading up to and following restatement announcements, I analyze the monthly time-
series paired difference in the change of level of short interest between sample and 
control firms. In a multivariate setting, paired differences in level of short interest is 
regressed on paired differences in prices, paired differences in book-to-market ratios, and 
month relative to restatement announcements. Dechow et al (2001) observe that short 
sellers move in when price increases and move out when price decreases and they are 
more likely to establish positions in firms with low book-to-market ratios.16 These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that short sellers take positions in overvalued 
stocks and square their positions to profit when the price declines. Controlling for 
differences in prices and book-to-market ratios provides a better test of whether short 
sellers can identify firms that manipulate accounting numbers beyond the reasons of price 
run-up or overvaluation. 
                                                
16 The fact that Dechow et al. (2001) document that 11 percent of firms classified as having a high level of 
short interest are in the top decile book-to-market ratio portfolio is very interesting. I suspect a high book 
value for some of these firms is the result of accounting manipulations.   
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FIGURE 1 
Mean Level of Short Interest from 1988 to 2002 
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TABLE 5 
Monthly Change in the Level of Short Interest from 1988 to 2002 
 
Month 
Change in the level 
of short interest(a) Std Dev 
t-test 
p-value(b) 
# of months in 15 year 
period where changes 
are greater than 0%
Dec - Jan -13.06% 7.57% -6.68 0 
Jan - Feb 2.13% 1.85% 4.46 12 
Feb - Mar 0.39% 4.66% 0.32 9 
Mar - Apr 2.29% 3.34% 2.65 10 
Apr - May 0.07% 2.04% 0.13 9 
May - Jun 1.30% 2.44% 2.06 11 
Jun - Jul 1.43% 3.02% 1.84 10 
Jul - Aug 1.43% 2.73% 2.09 10 
Aug - Sep 0.52% 1.95% 1.06 7 
Sep - Oct 2.63% 2.99% 3.51 11 
Oct - Nov 0.03% 2.24% 0.06 5 
Nov - Dec 2.68% 9.60% 1.12 6 
Mean 0.20% 3.70%   
 
Notes: 
(a) Change in the level of short interest = (level of short interestt - level of short interestt-1) / level 
of short interestt. 
(b) The column reports the p-values from two-sided t-tests for the changes in the levels of 
short interest. 
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For each restatement, I have 25 monthly observations covering both 12 months 
before and after the announcement with the restatement announcement month in the 
middle. The variable relative month equals 0 for the announcement month, equals 12 
for the 12 months prior to the announcement, and equals +12 for the 12 months after the 
announcement. In the multiple regressions setting, the variable relative month captures 
the trend (or movement) in the paired difference in the level of short interest. Two 
separate regressions are conducted. One for the pre-disclosure period and one for the post 
disclosure period because I expect an increase in level of short interest in the pre-
disclosure period and a decrease in the post-disclosure period. To mitigate the concern 
about serial correlation in regressions using longitudinal observations, I apply the Prais-
Winsten procedure to correct for first-order serial correlation.17 
DIFSHORT = β0 + β1DIFPRICE + β2DIFBMV + β3RELMONTH + e        (1) 
where:  
DIFSHORT  is the paired difference between the levels of short interest of sample 
and control firms [DIFSHORTt = SHORT Samplet  SHORT 
Controlt]; 
DIFPRICE is the paired difference in the monthly price between control and 
sample firms [DIFPRICEt = PRICE Samplet  PRICE Controlt]; 
DIFBMV  is the paired difference in book-to-market ratios of control and 
sample firms [DIFBMVt = BMV Samplet  BMV Controlt]; and 
                                                
17 When autocorrelation exists in OLS residuals, the OLS estimator is unbiased but not efficient. The 
sampling variances are underestimated, causing inferences from t- and F-tests to be invalid. One way to 
compensate for the autocorrelated residuals is to apply the Prais-Winsten procedure. This procedure 
estimates the autoregressive form of the error term and then estimates the coefficients via generalized least 
squares (GLS). One particular advantage of the Prais-Winsten to Cochrane-Orcut procedure is that it retains 
the information in the first observation (Greene 1990, 442). 
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RELMONTH  is a trend variable that starts as -12 at the 12th month before the 
restatement month and increases to +12 at the 12th month after the 
restatement month. 
Alternatively, I run the following regression to detect if the level of short interest 
increases in months leading up to accounting restatements. Instead of using the variable 
RELMONTH, this regression uses twelve MONTH dummy variables. 
DIFSHORT = β0 + β1DIFPRICE + β2DIFBMV + δ1MONTHt-1 + δ2MONTHt-2 + 
 + δ11MONTHt-11 + e             (2) 
where:             
MONTHt is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for the observation month relative to 
corrective disclosure, set equal to 0 otherwise. The base month used 
is the 12th month prior to the restatement announcement; and 
All remaining terms are as previously defined. 
This model is not restricted to linear monthly changes in the level of short 
interest. Further, it potentially provides insights to when (relative to restatement 
announcement) the level of short interest begins to increase and during which months the 
increases are significant. 
Restatement Severity  
Palmrose et al. (2004) report that market reactions to restatement announcements 
vary for different types of restatements. I classify the severity of restatements based on 
the following factors: intention of fraud, types of accounts affected, and the materiality of 
the restatements. I use a multivariate approach similar to Dechow et al. (2001) and 
Richardson (2003) to evaluate whether there is a relationship between the level of short 
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interests in the months leading up to the restatement announcements and the severity of 
the restatements. Since the following tests are cross sectional (non-paired) tests, I include 
a dummy variable for whether a firm belongs to high restatement industries and control 
for log of market value, book-to-market ratio, and dividend yield. Dechow et al. (2001) 
show that short sellers take transaction costs into account when they establish their 
positions. They are more likely to short stocks of larger firms because of higher liquidity. 
Short sellers are also less likely to take positions in firms that pay dividends because 
stock prices tend to fall by less than the amount of the dividend the short-seller is 
required to reimburse. Dechow et al. (2001) find that short sellers use book-to-market 
ratios to identify overvalued stocks. Therefore, controlling for transaction costs of short 
selling and book-to-market ratios, I examine whether short sellers can distinguish the 
severity of the GAAP violation. I also include a dummy variable to control for high 
restatement industries. These are the six 2-digit industries with more than 5 percent 
frequency of restatement listed on Table 3.  
In order for a restatement to be classified as fraud, it must have either a clear 
statement from the company that fraud is involved or that the restatement is subject to 
SECs AAER. I partition the types of accounts restated to core (or revenue) accounts and 
non-core (or non-revenue) accounts. Following Palmrose et al. (2004), I define 
materiality in two ways. The first measure of materiality is the amount of correction 
divided by total assets in the period prior to restatement. This variable captures both the 
relative size of the restatement and the direction of its impact on net income. The second 
materiality variable is the number of quarters restated. I run the following regression 
analysis for each of the severity measures.  
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SHORTt = β0 + β1HIDNUM + β2LOGMVt + β3BMVt + β4DIVYIELDt + 
β5SEVERITY + e                         (3) 
where: 
SHORT  is level of short interest; 
HIDNUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a high 
restatement industry (2-digit SIC code 28, 35, 36, 38, 60, and 73); 
LOGMV  is log of market value;  
BMV  is book-to-market ratio; 
DIVYIELD is total dividends paid during the last fiscal year divided by price at 
the end of the last fiscal year; and 
SEVERITY  (a) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if fraud is involved and 0 
otherwise; 
 (b) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if core (revenue) accounts are 
involved and 0 otherwise; 
 (c) is a variable for materiality measured by the amount of correction 
divided by total assets in the year prior to restatements; 
(d) is a variable for materiality measured by the number of quarters 
restated. 
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VI. RESULTS 
 
 
Restatement vs. Control Firms 
 Univariate comparison for the level of short interest for restatement and control 
firms are reported on Figure 2 and Table 6. Level of short interest is already higher for 
restatement firms compared to control firms in month 12. The difference in the level of 
short interest, on average, hovers around 0.5 percent from month 12 to month 6. After 
month 6, paired difference in the level of short interest increases continuously and peaks 
at about 1 percent in month 0. Subsequently after the restatement announcements, paired 
differences in the level of short interest declines and falls to less than 0.4 percent in 
month +12. The paired differences of level of short interest are significantly greater than 
zero from month 12 to month +9, but become insignificant afterwards. Hence, the 
controlled univariate results support hypothesis 1(a). Figure 2 shows that there is a 
disparity between the mean and median paired difference in the level of short interest. 
The distribution is skewed to the right meaning that there are firms with very high levels 
of short interest. This pattern calls for further investigation to determine whether there is 
a relationship between different categories of restatement with the level of short interest. 
It is interesting to observe that Table 6 shows an increasing trend in the level of short 
interest for the control firms through time. This reinforces the importance of the time 
control in studying the level of short interest. 
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FIGURE 2 
Paired Difference in the Level of Short Interest between Sample vs. Control Firms 
Surrounding Restatement Announcements 
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TABLE 6 
Comparison of Level of Short Interest between Restatement and Control Firms 
 
    Restatement Firms Control Firms(b) Paired Difference 
Relative 
Month(a) N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
t-test 
p-value(c) 
-12 497 2.1433 0.8001 1.4874 0.5062 0.6559 0.1101 0.0013 
-11 503 2.0861 0.7533 1.5999 0.4866 0.4862 0.0820 0.0184 
-10 508 2.1476 0.7307 1.6517 0.5349 0.4958 0.0364 0.0165 
-9 513 2.2664 0.8661 1.7551 0.6202 0.5113 0.0198 0.0171 
-8 524 2.2814 0.8226 1.7265 0.6187 0.5548 0.0615 0.0078 
-7 526 2.2946 0.8303 1.8052 0.6491 0.4894 0.0474 0.0305 
-6 528 2.3892 0.9565 1.8933 0.6561 0.4959 0.0573 0.0386 
-5 535 2.5056 0.9698 1.7312 0.5929 0.7744 0.1216 0.0007 
-4 536 2.5541 1.0007 1.7082 0.5935 0.8459 0.1265 0.0002 
-3 538 2.4873 0.9629 1.7363 0.5995 0.7510 0.0885 0.0009 
-2 539 2.5823 0.9728 1.6866 0.6239 0.8957 0.1010 0.0001 
-1 540 2.6101 1.0424 1.6986 0.6223 0.9115 0.1746 0.0001 
0 531 2.6602 1.1145 1.6186 0.6219 1.0417 0.1870 0.0001 
1 524 2.5748 1.1034 1.6557 0.5645 0.9191 0.2029 0.0001 
2 521 2.5862 1.0409 1.7161 0.5791 0.8700 0.1451 0.0002 
3 519 2.6362 1.0156 1.8523 0.6764 0.7839 0.0732 0.0030 
4 516 2.6459 1.0596 1.8436 0.6586 0.8024 0.1145 0.0007 
5 513 2.5952 1.0531 1.8824 0.6955 0.7128 0.0999 0.0031 
6 509 2.6806 1.1137 1.8590 0.7009 0.8216 0.0879 0.0011 
7 497 2.7222 1.2133 1.9240 0.7304 0.7982 0.1199 0.0024 
8 475 2.6160 1.0815 1.9731 0.7102 0.6429 0.0409 0.0151 
9 459 2.6783 1.1759 2.0352 0.6574 0.6431 0.0592 0.0289 
10 439 2.6728 1.1352 2.2583 0.7373 0.4145 0.0584 0.1998 
11 417 2.5812 1.0908 2.2191 0.7842 0.3621 0.0407 0.2673 
12 401 2.6253 1.0654 2.2578 0.7610 0.3675 0.0222 0.2730 
 
Notes: 
(a) Relative month denotes the month relative to the restatement announcement month which is 0.  
(b) Control firms are selected based on industry and size. A list of potential control firms with the 
same 2-digit SIC code are identified for each restatement firm. The firm with the smallest 
absolute difference in Total Assets is selected as the matched paired control firm.  
(c) The column reports the p-values from two-sided t-tests for the mean paired differences in the 
level of short interest between restatement and control firms.  
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Panel A of Table 7 reports the two-sided t-tests of paired changes in the level of 
short interest in a 3-month interval. All four of the quarterly mean paired changes leading 
up to month 0 are positive. The highest mean paired change is from month 3 to month 0 
with a mean paired increase of 0.2077 percent, but at best, it is nearly significant with a 
p-value of 0.1189. The mean and median paired changes in the level of short interest are 
more often negative or very close to zero in the period after the restatement. 
Dechow et al. (2001) show that changes in the level of short interest are related to 
other factors, including changes in price and book-to-market ratio. Therefore, I conduct a 
multivariate regression analysis including differences in price and book-to-market value 
between sample and control firms as control variables. Panel B of Table 7 reports 
regression results of differences in the level of short interest from month 12 to month 0 
(equation 1). The relationship between the two control variables and paired differences in 
level of short interest are consistent with expectations. The coefficient for paired 
differences in price is positive at 0.05 with a p-value of 0.0001. The coefficient for paired 
differences in book-to-market value is negative at 0.52 with a p-value of 0.0003. The 
coefficient of interest, relative month, is positive at 0.07 with a significant p-value at 
0.0009. This result indicates that there is a linear increase in level of short interest in 
months approaching the restatement announcements; thus supporting hypothesis 1(b). 
Model 2 offers a robustness check by controlling for annual differences in level of short 
interest and the results remain unchanged.  
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TABLE 7 
Comparison of Changes in the Level of Short Interest between Restatement and 
Control Firms 
 
Panel A: Paired Changes in Level of Short Interest for Each 3 Month Interval 
    Restatement(a) Control(b) Difference  
Month Interval N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
t-test 
p-value 
-12 to -9 501 0.1468 0.0090 0.0549 0.0024 0.0919 0.0077 0.2556
-9 to -6 521 0.1462 0.0000 0.0575 -0.0001 0.0888 0.0108 0.3930
-6 to -3 531 0.1054 0.0011 0.0365 0.0000 0.0689 -0.0019 0.5007
-3 to 0 526 0.1470 0.0014 -0.0607 -0.0011 0.2077 0.0281 0.1189
0 to 3 512 0.0492 -0.0001 0.1205 0.0063 -0.0713 -0.0166 0.6281
3 to 6 504 -0.0069 0.0000 -0.0090 -0.0021 0.0021 0.0052 0.9910
6 to 9 455 -0.0225 -0.0002 0.0514 0.0000 -0.0739 -0.0157 0.5392
9 to 12 397 0.0113 -0.0076 0.0007 0.0000 0.0106 -0.0305 0.9186
 
Panel B: Regression of Difference in Level of Short Interest (Month 12 to Month 0) 
Variables(c)  Model 1 Model 2 
Rel Month =   M-12 
to M0 
Predicted 
Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t| 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(d) 
INTERCEPT  1.36 0.0001 0.89 0.0083 
DIFPRICE (+) 0.05 0.0001 0.05 0.0001 
DIFBMV (-) -0.52 0.0003 -0.51 0.0004 
RELMONTH (+) 0.07 0.0009 0.07 0.0005 
DY96 (+)   -1.10 0.0067 
DY97 (+)   0.00 0.9992 
DY98 (+)   0.18 0.6839 
DY99 (+)   1.41 0.0001 
DY00 (+)   0.15 0.6861 
DY01 (+)   0.44 0.2058 
DY02 (+)   1.21 0.0009 
 
Panel C: Regression of Difference in Level of Short Interest (Month 0 to Month +12) 
Variables(c)  Model 1 Model 2 
Rel Month =   M0 to 
M+12 
Predicted 
Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t| 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(d) 
INTERCEPT  1.42 0.0001 0.03 0.9333 
DIFPRICE (+) 0.04 0.0001 0.04 0.0001 
DIFBMV (-) 0.09 0.3099 0.10 0.2642 
RELMONTH (+) -0.09 0.0002 -0.07 0.0030 
DY96 (+)   0.08 0.8682 
DY97 (+)   1.24 0.0137 
DY98 (+)   1.91 0.0003 
DY99 (+)   1.35 0.0013 
DY00 (+)   0.49 0.2415 
DY01 (+)   1.64 0.0001 
DY02 (+)   2.72 0.0001 
 
 38
TABLE 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Regression of Difference in Level of Short Interest with Dummy Month 
Variable 
Variables(c) Predicted Sign Parameter Estimate Pr > |t|(d) 
INTERCEPT  0.25 0.5547 
DIFPRICE (+) 0.05 0.0001 
DIFBMV (-) -0.51 0.0005 
DY96 (+) -1.10 0.0069 
DY97 (+) 0.00 0.9972 
DY98 (+) 0.18 0.6823 
DY99 (+) 1.41 0.0001 
DY00 (+) 0.14 0.6926 
DY01 (+) 0.44 0.2066 
DY02 (+) 1.21 0.0009 
DM-11 (+) -0.08 0.8226 
DM-10 (+) 0.00 0.9948 
DM-9 (+) -0.01 0.9812 
DM-8 (+) -0.01 0.9973 
DM-7 (+) 0.14 0.7139 
DM-6 (+) 0.20 0.5900 
DM-5 (+) 0.30 0.4102 
DM-4 (+) 0.40 0.2753 
DM-3 (+) 0.33 0.3776 
DM-2 (+) 0.47 0.1992 
DM-1 (+) 0.61 0.0960 
DM0 (+) 0.79 0.0339 
 
Notes: 
(a) Control firms are selected based on industry and size. A list of potential control firms with the 
same 2-digit SIC code are identified for each restatement firm. The firm with the smallest 
absolute difference in Total Assets is selected as the matched paired control firm.  
(b) The column reports the p-values from two-sided t-tests for the mean paired differences in the 
level of short interest between restatement and control firms.  
(c) DIFSHORT is the paired difference between the level of short interest of sample and control 
firms [DIFSHORTt = SHORT Samplet  SHORT Controlt]; DIFFPRICE is the paired difference 
in monthly price between control and sample firms [DIFFPRICEt = PRICE Samplet  PRICE 
Controlt]; DIFFBMV is the paired difference in book-to-market ratios of control and sample firms 
[DIFFBMVt = BMV Samplet  BMV Controlt];  RELMONTH  is a trend variable that starts as -
12 at the 12th month before the restatement month and increases to +12 at the 12th month after the 
restatement month; DY96 is a dummy year 96 variable which is 1 if year is 1996 and 0 otherwise 
 and so forth; DM-11 is a dummy month which is equal to 1 if the relative month is -11 and 0 
otherwise  and so forth. 
(d) Prais-Winston procedure to correct for first-order serial correlation is used to calculate the 
significance. 
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Panel C of Table 7 presents the same regression for month 0 to month +12. The 
coefficient for relative month is 0.09 with p-value of 0.0002, indicating that paired 
difference in level of short interest decreases as time progresses in the post restatement 
period. Rather than using relative month as an independent variable, Panel D of Table 7 
reports the results using relative month dummy variables from month 12 (equation 2). 
Although the coefficients of the month dummy variables are positive in 9 out of the 12 
months, they are significant only for dummy month 1 and dummy month 0. The results 
show that month 1 and month 0 level of short interest are 0.61 percent and 0.79 percent 
higher compared to month-12 and the differences are significant at p-values of 0.0960 
and 0.0339. 
Within Restatement Firms Partitioned by the Severity Measures 
 Figure 3 depicts the level of short interest for fraud restatement firms along with 
those of no fraud firms. The level of short interest is higher for fraud firms compared to 
the no fraud firms in most of the pre-announcement period. Panel A of Table 8 shows the 
results of a regression of level of short interest on a fraud dummy variable (equation 3). 
All control variables in the regression are significant and in the expected directions. 
HIDNUM is a dummy variable indicating if a firm belongs to a high restatement two-
digit industry. Consistent with expectations, the reported coefficient for HIDNUM 
indicates that, on average, the level of short interest is 0.63 percent higher for firms that 
belong to the high restatement industries. The coefficient for LOGMV is also positive 
which is consistent with prior findings that shares of larger firms are more liquid and 
liquidity is negatively associated with the transactions costs of short selling.  
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FIGURE 3 
Paired Difference in the Level of Short Interest between Fraud and No-Fraud 
Restatements Surrounding Restatement Announcements 
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TABLE 8 
Regression of the Level of Short Interest for Fraud vs. No-Fraud Firms 
 
Panel A: Aggregate from Month-12 to Month 0 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables(s) Predicted Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(b) 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(b) 
INTERCEPT  -1.3700 0.0001 -1.4725 0.0001 
HIDNUM (+) 0.6307 0.0001 0.5953 0.0001 
FRAUD (+) 0.5984 0.0001 0.7324 0.0001 
LOGMV (+) 0.7007 0.0001 0.6488 0.0001 
BMV (-) -0.3312 0.0163 -0.3891 0.0049 
DIVYIELD (-) -0.0273 0.0001 -0.0253 0.0001 
RELMONTH (+) 0.0434 0.0028 0.0443 0.0019 
DY96 (+)   -0.9208 0.0014 
DY97 (+)   0.8211 0.0111 
DY98 (+)   -0.0751 0.8170 
DY99 (+)   0.9977 0.0002 
DY00 (+)   0.0463 0.8570 
DY01 (+)   0.6016 0.0166 
DY02 (+)   0.8031 0.0024 
 
Panel B: Only at Specific Month (Snap-shot Approach) 
  Month-12 Month-9 Month-6 Month-3 
Variables(a) 
Predicted 
Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t| 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
INTERCEPT  -2.1539 0.0228 -2.2713 0.0128 -1.8543 0.0500 -1.4057 0.1147
HIDNUM (+) 0.3209 0.4026 0.5873 0.1250 0.7057 0.0756 0.6933 0.0897
FRAUD (+) 1.0918 0.0354 0.9588 0.0639 0.7450 0.1693 0.3094 0.5831
LOGMV (+) 0.6964 0.0001 0.6805 0.0001 0.6880 0.0001 0.6264 0.0001
BMV (-) -0.1641 0.7217 -0.2987 0.5414 -0.3134 0.5253 -0.5927 0.2426
DIVYIELD (-) -0.0219 0.0042 -0.0266 0.0004 -0.0279 0.0005 -0.0258 0.0017
DY96 (+) -0.6937 0.5065 -0.4570 0.6466 -0.9552 0.3651 -1.1573 0.2820
DY97 (+) 0.9946 0.3958 1.7928 0.1105 0.7436 0.5336 0.4647 0.7022
DY98 (+) 0.3057 0.8016 0.0497 0.9657 -0.6568 0.5773 0.0955 0.9371
DY99 (+) 1.3029 0.1853 1.3750 0.1359 1.1941 0.2957 0.8118 0.4182
DY00 (+) 0.5497 0.5615 0.6217 0.4890 0.0567 0.9521 -0.5191 0.5900
DY01 (+) -0.0424 0.9640 0.4480 0.6097 0.2880 0.7554 0.8677 0.3538
DY02 (+) 0.1679 0.8643 0.8454 0.3619 0.5796 0.5518 0.8356 0.3972
 
Notes: 
(a) The dependent variable SHORT = number of common shares shorted / number of common 
shares outstanding; HIDNUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a high 
restatement industries (2-digit SIC code 28, 35, 36, 38, 60, and 73); FRAUD is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if fraud is involved and 0 otherwise; LOGMV is log of market value; BMV is book-to-
market ratio; DIVYIELD is total dividends paid during the last fiscal year divided by price at the 
end of the last fiscal year; DY96 is a dummy year 96 variable which is 1 if year is 1996 and 0 
otherwise  and so forth. 
(b) Prais-Winston procedure to correct for first-order serial correlation is used to calculate the 
significance. 
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The coefficient relative month again suggests that there is a linear increase in level of 
short interest for restatement firms from month 12 to month 0. On average, the monthly 
increase is about 0.04 percent and it is significant at a p-value 0.0028. The coefficients 
for DIVYIELD and BMV are both significantly negative which indicate that short sellers 
are less likely to take positions in firms that pay higher dividends or firms with higher 
book-to-market ratios (proxy for overvaluation). Finally, the variable of interest, Fraud, 
shows that level of short interest for firms labeled with fraud, on average, is almost 0.60 
percent higher compared to firms without fraud.  
 Panel B of Table 8 reports the results of regressions of level of short interest using 
a snap-shot approach. Although I had used a Prais-Winston procedure to correct for 
serial correlation in the previous regression, this alternative approach eliminates the 
problem of serial correlation by conducting four separate regressions at four different 
individual months (month 12, month 9, month 6, and month 3). Results in Panel B 
of Table 8 show that the coefficients for all control variables remain in the expected 
direction, except some of them now become insignificant perhaps due to a smaller 
number of observations. All coefficients for fraud in each snap-shot regression are 
positive, ranging from 0.3094 percent to 1.0918 percent and two out of four coefficients 
are significant. These reported results modestly support the hypothesis that short sellers 
can predict whether restatements will be related to fraud or not. 
The next results are based on partitioning the restatements into revenue versus 
non-revenue related restatements (equation 3). The results from partitioning restatements 
into core versus non-core accounts are not reported because the results are driven mainly  
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by revenue accounts. Figure 4 presents the level of short interest for firms restating 
revenue accounts versus firms restating non-revenue accounts. It is apparent that the level 
of short interest is higher for firms restating revenue accounts in all the observed months. 
I perform a multivariate regression with a revenue dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
for firms restating a revenue account and 0 otherwise. Panel A of Table 9 shows that all 
control variables are significant and remain in the predicted direction as with previous 
results.  
The coefficient for the revenue dummy variable is positive and significant. It 
indicates that, on average, level of short interest in the months prior to restatement 
announcements is higher by 0.89 percent for firms restating revenue accounts. Panel B of 
Table 9 reports the snap shot analysis of level of short interest at four different points in 
time. The coefficients for revenue dummy variables in all four regressions are all 
positive, ranging from 0.8218 percent to 1.3337 percent, and are all significant. This 
evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that short sellers are able to 
distinguish whether the GAAP violation involves revenue accounts.18   
                                                
18 Unreported results from partitioning the sample firms based on expense vs. non-expense related 
restatements show no indication that short sellers are able to differentiate between the two cases. I speculate 
my results are consistent because it is relatively easier to read  (financial statement numbers and notes) 
whether a firm has aggressively recognized revenue compared to whether a firm has misreported expenses. 
Additionally, firms restating revenue accounts suffer more severe price drops compared to firms restating 
expense accounts. Hence, short sellers may be less interested in targeting firms misreporting expenses. 
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FIGURE 4 
Paired Difference in the Level of Short Interest between Revenue and Non-Revenue 
Restatements Surrounding Restatement Announcements 
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TABLE 9 
Regression of the Level of Short Interest for Revenue vs. Non-Revenue Accounts 
 
Panel A: Aggregate from Month-12 to Month 0 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables(s) Predicted Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(b) 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(b) 
INTERCEPT  -1.6386 0.0001 -1.6897 0.0001 
HIDNUM (+) 0.6259 0.0010 0.5883 0.0001 
REVENUE (+) 0.8915 0.0001 1.0779 0.0001 
LOGMV (+) 0.6922 0.0001 0.6458 0.0001 
BMV (-) -0.2579 0.0610 -0.2702 0.0505 
DIVYIELD (-) -0.0259 0.0001 -0.0240 0.0001 
RELMONTH (+) 0.0431 0.0029 0.0439 0.0019 
DY96 (+)   -1.0446 0.0003 
DY97 (+)   0.7458 0.0203 
DY98 (+)   -0.0067 0.9834 
DY99 (+)   1.0371 0.0001 
DY00 (+)   -0.1577 0.5390 
DY01 (+)   0.2026 0.4234 
DY02 (+)   0.8001 0.0024 
 
Panel B: Only at Specific Month (Snap-shot Approach) 
  Month-12 Month-9 Month-6 Month-3 
Variables(a) 
Predicted 
Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t| 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
INTERCEPT  -2.3308 0.0136 -2.4987 0.0058 -2.0729 0.0287 -1.6568 0.0841
HIDNUM (+) 0.3466 0.3636 0.5887 0.1201 0.7029 0.0759 0.6609 0.1027
REVENUE (+) 1.0291 0.0097 1.3337 0.0008 0.8218 0.0487 1.1664 0.0062
LOGMV (+) 0.6979 0.0001 0.6811 0.0001 0.6958 0.0001 0.6125 0.0001
BMV (-) -0.0640 0.8897 -0.1398 0.7744 -0.2326 0.6384 -0.4374 0.3870
DIVYIELD (-) -0.0203 0.0077 -0.0248 0.0009 -0.0271 0.0007 -0.0246 0.0025
DY96 (+) -0.7996 0.4433 -0.6486 0.5122 -1.0066 0.3391 -1.3160 0.2180
DY97 (+) 0.9182 0.4320 1.6477 0.1390 0.7145 0.5488 0.4002 0.7399
DY98 (+) 0.3514 0.7720 0.0833 0.9418 -0.5453 0.6423 0.1379 0.9083
DY99 (+) 1.3120 0.1810 1.3521 0.1388 1.0788 0.2677 0.8942 0.3688
DY00 (+) 0.3974 0.6750 0.3221 0.7194 -0.0602 0.9492 -0.7737 0.4199
DY01 (+) -0.4427 0.6396 -0.1162 0.8955 -0.0131 0.9888 0.4794 0.6093
DY02 (+) 0.1339 0.8912 0.7908 0.3893 0.6116 0.5291 0.8275 0.3977
 
Notes: 
(a) The dependent variable SHORT = number of common shares shorted / number of common 
shares outstanding; HIDNUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a high 
restatement industry (2-digit SIC code 28, 35, 36, 38, 60, and 73); REVENUE is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if revenue accounts are restated and 0 otherwise; LOGMV is log of market 
value; BMV is book-to-market ratio; DIVYIELD is total dividends paid during the last fiscal year 
divided by price at the end of the last fiscal year; DY96 is a dummy year variable which is 1 if 
year is 1996 and 0 otherwise  and so forth. 
(b) Prais-Winston procedure to correct for first-order serial correlation is used to calculate the 
significance. 
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Table 10 reports results of regressing the levels of short interest on the number of 
quarters restated along with other control variables (equation 3). For this analysis, I 
exclude observations in which the number of quarters restated exceeds seven (above 75th 
percentile). The reason is because it is very expensive and risky to maintain a short 
position especially when no significant bad news about accounting manipulations or 
GAAP violations emerges after several months. Although short sellers can identify firms 
that are involved in manipulations, they cant control when restatements will be 
announced and prices will fall. Panel A of Table 10 shows that coefficients of all the 
control variables are significant and in the expected directions. The coefficient for 
number of quarters is significantly positive at a p-value of 0.0002. It suggests that, on 
average, the level of short interest increases by 0.1513 percent for each additional quarter 
restated. Results using the snap shot approach reported on Panel B of Table 10 show that 
coefficients for number of quarters in the snap-shot regressions are all positive but none 
of them are significant. These results offer limited support for the hypothesis that short 
sellers have a good sense of the number of quarters firms have violated GAAP.19 
 
                                                
19 Number of quarters restated and magnitude of restatements could be biased surrogates for the materiality 
of accounting manipulation. Management may underacknowledge the materiality to lessen the negative 
consequences while hoping they can make it up in the future (just like the way it started). Management may 
also overacknowledge the materiality in order to save for the future (big bath hypothesis).    
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TABLE 10 
Regression of the Level of Short Interest on Number of Quarters Restated 
 
Panel A: Aggregate from Month-12 to Month 0 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables(s) Predicted Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(b) 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(b) 
INTERCEPT  -1.7464 0.0001 -1.7780 0.0001 
HIDNUM (+) 0.6715 0.0001 0.5735 0.0001 
QUARTER (+) 0.1513 0.0002 0.0823 0.0467 
LOGMV (+) 0.7509 0.0001 0.6762 0.0001 
BMV (-) -0.5160 0.0669 -0.6315 0.0250 
DIVYIELD (-) -0.0272 0.0001 -0.0235 0.0001 
RELMONTH (+) 0.0591 0.0018 0.0606 0.0008 
DY96 (+)   -0.7021 0.0314 
DY97 (+)   0.9419 0.0094 
DY98 (+)   0.0188 0.9586 
DY99 (+)   1.4834 0.0001 
DY00 (+)   -0.0235 0.9368 
DY01 (+)   1.2553 0.0001 
DY02 (+)   1.8640 0.0001 
 
Panel B: Only at Specific Month (Snap-shot Approach) 
  Month-12 Month-9 Month-6 Month-3 
Variables(a) 
Predicted 
Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t| 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
INTERCEPT  -2.1836 0.0392 -2.4679 0.0293 -2.3350 0.0538 -2.2252 0.0791
HIDNUM (+) 0.5060 0.2569 0.7469 0.1235 0.5634 0.2739 0.5809 0.2959
QUARTER (+) 0.0595 0.6472 0.0548 0.6927 0.0883 0.5535 1.5701 0.3318
LOGMV (+) 0.6665 0.0001 0.6836 0.0001 0.7284 0.0001 0.6799 0.0001
BMV (-) -0.8552 0.4696 -0.7966 0.5487 -0.8140 0.5201 -0.6363 0.4296
DIVYIELD (-) -0.0186 0.0245 -0.0222 0.0105 -0.0263 0.0048 -0.0260 0.0090
DY96 (+) -0.5786 0.5882 -0.4333 0.6959 -0.6865 0.5717 -0.7629 0.5564
DY97 (+) 0.9802 0.4121 2.0108 0.1049 1.0659 0.4339 0.5258 0.7152
DY98 (+) 0.4380 0.7214 0.3340 0.7940 -0.4051 0.7621 0.1218 0.9320
DY99 (+) 1.7725 0.0839 1.7695 0.0909 1.2686 0.2637 1.3567 0.2648
DY00 (+) 0.2940 0.7654 0.5283 0.6052 0.0858 0.9386 -0.4905 0.6767
DY01 (+) 0.2883 0.7652 0.9176 0.3492 1.0263 0.3396 1.6131 0.1536
DY02 (+) 0.7294 0.4935 1.8384 0.0915 1.9338 0.1041 1.9821 0.1150
 
Notes: 
(a) The dependent variable SHORT = number of common shares shorted / number of common 
shares outstanding; HIDNUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a high 
restatement industries (2-digit SIC code 28, 35, 36, 38, 60, and 73); QUARTER is number of 
quarters restated; LOGMV is log of market value; BMV is book-to-market ratio; DIVYIELD is 
total dividends paid during the last fiscal year divided by price at the end of the last fiscal year; 
DY96 is a dummy year variable which is 1 if year is 1996 and 0 otherwise  and so forth. 
(b) Prais-Winston procedure to correct for first-order serial correlation is used to calculate the 
significance. 
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Next, I evaluate the relationship between the level of short interest and the 
magnitude of the restatements (equation 3). Because some of the restatements increase 
net income, I include only those observations in which the restatements decrease net 
income. Panel A of Table 11 shows that all the control variables within the regression are 
in the expected direction. The regression coefficient for magnitude is 1.2888 and is 
significant at a p-value of 0.0596. Panel B of Table 11indicates that all coefficients of 
magnitude from the four snap-shot regressions are positive as expected but none of 
them are significant. These findings provide limited support for the assertion that short 
sellers can see through the magnitude of GAAP violations prior to the restatement 
announcements. 
Level of Short Interest and Abnormal Returns 
 Dechow et al. (2001) and Desai et al. (2002) provide evidence that, in 
general, the level of short interest is negatively associated with returns. In this section, I 
evaluate whether the level of short interest is associated with returns among restatement 
firms. Panel A of Table 12 shows that, on average, restatement firms in this study suffer 
approximately 5.60 percent abnormal returns in the 5-day window surrounding the 
disclosure date. Panel B of Table 12 reports the short window abnormal returns of the top 
and the bottom quartile portfolios based on the level of short interest. The top quartile 
portfolio has short-term cumulative abnormal returns of -7.1 percent and -6.2 percent for 
the 5- and 3-day windows. The abnormal returns are -7.3 percent and -7.4 percent for the 
(0,+1) and (0,+2) windows. Meanwhile, the bottom quartile portfolio has short-term 
cumulative abnormal returns of -3.8 percent and -3.5 percent for the 5- and 3-day 
windows. The abnormal returns for the (0,+1) and (0,+2) windows are -3.0 percent and -
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3.4 percent respectively. A t-test comparing the returns between the two portfolios shows 
that the mean differences in the abnormal returns are -3.3 percent, -2.7 percent, -4.3 
percent, and -4.0 percent respectively. These differences are significant for the (0,+1) and 
(0,+2) windows with p-value of 0.0348 and 0.0638. These findings support hypothesis 3 
by providing evidence that the price drops at the restatement announcements are more 
severe when short sellers establish stronger positions. Although results from the prior 
subsection show that level of short interest is higher for more severe restatements, they 
do not provide a direct test of the proposition that the main motivation for short selling is 
to make a profit. Linking levels of short interest with abnormal returns provides a direct 
test on the ability of short sellers to maximize profit for a set of firms with restatement 
announcements. This implies that short sellers use their knowledge about the severity of 
the GAAP violation and trade accordingly to generate profits. 
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TABLE 11 
Regression of the Level of Short Interest on Restatement Magnitude 
 
Panel A: Aggregate from Month-12 to Month 0 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables(s) Predicted Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(b) 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|(b) 
INTERCEPT  -1.6998 0.0001 -1.7292 0.0001 
HIDNUM (+) 0.8575 0.0001 0.8228 0.0001 
MAGNITUDE (+) 1.2888 0.0596 1.7597 0.0103 
LOGMV (+) 0.6482 0.0001 0.6210 0.0001 
BMV (-) -0.2184 0.0980 -0.2520 0.0572 
DIVYIELD (-) -0.0203 0.0001 -0.0177 0.0001 
RELMONTH (+) 0.0084 0.6122 0.0091 0.5775 
DY96 (+)   -1.1139 0.0004 
DY97 (+)   0.8589 0.0077 
DY98 (+)   -0.2483 0.4581 
DY99 (+)   0.3267 0.2622 
DY00 (+)   0.1412 0.6086 
DY01 (+)   0.2628 0.3203 
DY02 (+)   0.7472 0.0116 
 
Panel B: Only at Specific Month (Snap-shot Approach) 
  Month-12 Month-9 Month-6 Month-3 
Variables(s) 
Predicted 
Sign 
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t|
Parameter 
Estimate Pr > |t| 
Parameter
Estimate Pr > |t|
INTERCEPT  -1.8678 0.0908 -2.1191 0.0426 -2.1740 0.0452 -1.5900 0.1050
HIDNUM (+) 0.4274 0.3795 0.7908 0.0937 0.9625 0.0470 1.0266 0.0224
MAGNITUDE (+) 0.4670 0.8871 1.3236 0.6827 3.8668 0.2544 1.3283 0.4194
LOGMV (+) 0.6650 0.0001 0.6520 0.0001 0.6805 0.0001 0.5667 0.0001
BMV (-) -0.1950 0.6858 -0.3448 0.5205 -0.2561 0.6126 -0.2517 0.5936
DIVYIELD (-) -0.0163 0.0803 -0.0199 0.0202 -0.0225 0.0135 -0.0149 0.0671
DY96 (+) -0.9128 0.4695 -0.7740 0.5095 -1.0544 0.3883 -1.2167 0.2738
DY97 (+) 0.7844 0.5400 1.6748 0.1598 1.0787 0.3909 0.7728 0.4983
DY98 (+) 0.0730 0.9581 -0.1611 0.8994 -0.6807 0.5945 0.0266 0.9819
DY99 (+) 0.6528 0.5772 0.6851 0.5251 0.9662 0.3926 0.0305 0.9766
DY00 (+) 0.2880 0.7952 0.4606 0.6555 0.4674 0.6640 -0.0779 0.9363
DY01 (+) -0.3674 0.7351 0.2059 0.8346 0.1721 0.8678 0.0571 0.5410
DY02 (+) 0.8006 0.5018 1.2947 0.2415 0.8674 0.4481 0.6040 0.5641
 
a) The dependent variable SHORT = number of common shares shorted / number of common 
shares outstanding; HIDNUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a high 
restatement industries (2-digit SIC code 28, 35, 36, 38, 60, and 73); MAGNITUDE is equal to the 
amount of correction / total assets in the year prior to the restatement announcement; LOGMV is 
log of market value; BMV is book-to-market ratio; DIVYIELD is total dividends paid during the 
last fiscal year divided by price at the end of the last fiscal year; DY96 is a dummy year variable 
which is 1 if year is 1996 and 0 otherwise  and so forth. 
(b) Prais-Winston procedure to correct for first-order serial correlation is used to calculate the 
significance. 
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TABLE 12 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Restatement Announcements 
 
Panel A: CAR Surrounding the Restatement Announcements for All Sample Firms 
Window Number CAR 
(-2,+2) 423 -0.0560 
(-1,+1) 421 -0.0545 
(0,+1) 417 -0.0548 
(0,+2) 418 -0.0532 
 
Panel B: Comparison of CAR between Top vs. Bottom Quartile Level of Short 
Interest Portfolio 
 Top Quartile Bottom Quartile Difference 
Window Number CAR Number CAR CAR t-value Pr > |t| 
(-2,+2) 112 -0.071 96 -0.038 -0.033 1.45 0.1490 
(-1,+1) 112 -0.062 94 -0.035 -0.027 1.29 0.1986 
(0,+1) 110 -0.073 93 -0.030 -0.043 2.13 0.0348 
(0,+2) 110 -0.074 93 -0.034 -0.040 1.86 0.0638 
 
Notes: 
CAR is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns calculated using the EVENTUS 
statistical module. 
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VII. FUTURE STUDIES AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 Short selling contributes to pricing efficiency that is very important in efficient 
markets. However, research on short sellers trading strategy, behavior, and 
sophistication is relatively limited and is still in an early stage. Although Dechow et al. 
(2001) and I show that short sellers can identify overvalued firms as well as firms that 
manipulate accounting numbers, we do not examine the source and the type of 
information used by short sellers. Future research efforts could investigate whether short 
sellers use accounting information such as Lev and Thiagarajans (1993) fundamental 
analysis to arrive at their target companies. In addition, researchers could look into 
whether short sellers use non-financial information such as quality of corporate 
governance to establish their positions. Some studies have used different measures for 
corporate governance quality such as board composition, CEO power, and existence of an 
audit committee. Related to pricing efficiency, one could investigate short sellers 
behavior in different markets (countries) where transaction costs of short selling are 
different. Further, one can examine levels of short interests under different accounting 
regimes (across time or markets). As I suggested earlier, the quality of disclosure may 
affect the ability of short sellers to identify and understand the degree of problems in a 
company, and therefore, affect the level of short interest.  
In this study, I provide evidence that short sellers are sophisticated investors with 
regards to accounting manipulations. The results show that firms involved in accounting 
manipulations have high, and an increasing, level of short interest leading up to the 
restatement announcements. Further, short sellers can distinguish types of restatements 
before the announcements are made. They establish higher short positions in restatements 
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involving fraud, revenue accounts, and to some extent, restatements with more quarters 
and larger in magnitude. These findings are important because they suggest short sellers 
are highly sophisticated investors with regards to bad news. Therefore, investors, 
auditors, analysts, and regulators should pay closer attention to short sellers activity to 
identify hyped or manipulated companies. We are blessed to have an optimistic nation 
since optimism leads to hope and progress. However, as Bernard Baruch stated nearly a 
century ago, Uncurbed false optimism always leads to disaster. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
HISTORY OF SHORT SELLING 
 
 
Short selling is selling a security that a seller doesnt own by borrowing the 
security from, typically, a broker-dealer or an institutional investor. Short sellers hope for 
prices to decline after they establish their positions. When the stock price falls, short 
sellers close out their positions by purchasing equivalent securities on the open market to 
make a profit. Therefore, short selling is an investment method used to profit from an 
expected downward price movement. Aside from its function as an instrument for 
speculation, short selling is often used for hedging and arbitrage activities. Generally, 
some small portion of short interest exists day-to-day for hedging and arbitrage purposes. 
However, when the portion of short interest increases and becomes large, it indicates that 
professional short sellers are betting on a price decline. 
 Short sellers have been traditionally unpopular throughout history because they 
make money from others misfortune. Today, they are often unfairly blamed as the cause 
of market crash. Short sellers also have often been labeled as unpatriotic because they 
profit from calamitous events such as the recent September 11 terrorist attack. There were 
even allegations that terrorist groups establish heavy short interest just prior to the 911-
attack. The fact is, however, short sellers neither have any control over tragedies nor 
market crashes.20 Charles Tennes, a Director of Rydex Global Portfolio Management, 
                                                
20 FBI officials had investigated a dual Egyptian and U.S. Citizenship stock trader who shorted stocks prior 
to the September 11, 2001 tragedy for a potential connection to terrorist groups. The FBI, however, found 
no evidence of the connection (Wall Street Journal 2002). Market crash is generally attributed to poor 
business conditions or unsustainable hype.   
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said,  we should remember that those who bought flood insurance did not cause the 
flood but they are entitled to the claim (Tauli 2003).    
 The following sections of this chapter provide a historical perspective of short 
selling from the Dutch Republic in early 1600s to the present. The sections illustrate 
how short selling develops from individual activities into institutional activities carried 
out by hedge funds and then short-only funds. It shows how short sellers evolved from 
market manipulators into forensic investors who target overvalued and fraudulent firms. I 
develop this history section primarily from the works of Chancelor (1999, 2001) and 
Tauli (2003). The final section in the chapter discusses the important role short selling 
plays in the efficient market. 
Short Selling in Early European Stock Markets 
 Although short selling seems to be counter-intuitive and sophisticated at first 
(because one sells first and then buy back to make a profit rather than the other way 
around), it has been practiced all the way back in the early 1600s at the Amsterdam 
Bourse. The Dutch did not invent the institutions and practices of financial capitalism 
such as double-entry bookkeeping, banking, bills of exchange, and stock markets. 
However, they created sophisticated financial instruments such as margin loans, futures 
contracts, options, as well as short selling. While some of these trading instruments had 
been used in the previous century for commodities such as grain, spices, oil, Italian silks, 
it was not until this era that these instruments become available for trading shares of 
companies such as the East India Company.21 
                                                
21 The Dutch also establish the Amsterdam Wisselbank, Europes first central bank, which paid no interest 
on deposits, made no loans, and issued notes only against its gold holdings. Its existence allowed Dutch 
merchants across the globe to settle their accounts in a universally accepted currency. All these 
developments earned Amsterdam the title as the financial capital of the world in that era. 
 62
 In 1609, Isaac Le Maire, a founding member of the Dutch East India Company, 
orchestrated the first known bear raid against the company he founded. Le Maire, 
relying on information he received from the companys treasurer, shorted heavily the 
shares of the East India Company creating an imbalance between supply and demand to 
bring the share price down. In addition, he spread horrible rumors to provoke the market. 
Although Le Maires raid ended in personal failure, the raid caused the East India 
Company to complain to the government, seeking protection from short sellers. The 
company claimed that these attacks were causing harm to innocent stockholders, among 
whom one will find many widows and orphans. It was the first time, but not the last, that 
the protection of the innocents was evoked in order to turn sentiments against short 
sellers. Subsequently, in 1610, the Dutch banned all short sales.      
 In the following century, as stock markets become established in France and 
Britain, the negative sentiment towards short sellers continued to spread to the new 
markets. In 1719 France, history recorded the first bubble in the Mississippi Company, 
which controlled among others, French Louisiana, French East India and China 
companies, the tobacco monopoly, and the mint. The hype and speculative fever in the 
company pushed the share price from under 500 livres (old French currency) to over 
20,000 by late 1719 and finally it fell back to under 500 livres. Following the collapse, 
short sellers who had profited from the decline in the Mississippi stock were fined and 
the practice of short selling was subsequently outlawed. Of course who else was to blame 
but those short sellers who profited from others misfortunes. Short sellers have been 
portrayed as ghoulish characters that hope for catastrophes. 
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At around the same time, the English had observed the sudden rise and collapse of 
The South Sea Company. Years later, the British Parliament passed a bill to prevent the 
practices of speculation by outlawing the use of futures, options, and short sales of 
stocks. Although the statute remained on the books until 1860, brokers continued to 
engage in short sales, which were enforced through a gentlemanly code of conduct rather 
than legal sanction.  
The French aversion towards short selling continues throughout the centuries. 
Napoleon considered short selling as unpatriotic and, in 1802, he signed a regulation 
subjecting short sellers to up to one year in imprisonment. He regarded short selling as an 
act of treason because it made raising money for his war more difficult when the market 
was shaky. The French dislike stays even to the recent years. After George Soros and 
other speculators shorted the sterling and drove down its value in September 1992, the 
French finance minister, Michael Sapin, commented that during the Revolution such 
people were known as agioteurs, and they were beheaded. 
Short Selling in the U.S. Stock Markets 
 The fate of short selling in the early United State capital market was similar to its 
counterparts in earlier European markets. The New York Legislature banned short selling 
in 1812. When the ban was finally lifted in the 1850s, it was accepted with open arms by 
speculators. Albeit the U.S. economy was growing strongly in the latter half of the 
century, the stock market was still small and was relatively easy to move or corner. Short 
selling was widely abused by speculators who loaded-up short positions and then 
circulated negative rumors to create fear that led to tumbling prices. One example: John 
Gates, the president of the American Steel and Wire Company, shorted shares of his 
 64
company then announced that the business was weak and he closed down plants and laid-
off workers. The news sent the share price down from 60 dollars to 30 dollars a share. He 
then squared his position, making a quick 30 dollars a share, and later announced that 
business had improved and the company reopened plants and rehired workers. No doubt, 
the lack of regulations such as rules on disclosures resulted in a rampant misuse of short 
selling. 
 In this era, nonetheless, short sellers themselves could become the victims of their 
own medicine. For example, Daniel Drew would manipulate a stock to hype-up the price. 
Short sellers, expecting that the stock price would collapse, would see this as an 
opportunity to make money. Unfortunately for them, Drew, who controlled most of the 
stock, would continue to drive the stock price upward. When short sellers were forced to 
cover their positions to avoid losses, their actions only accelerated the price increase and 
thus worsened their losses. In essence, short sellers were coerced to repurchase the stock 
at a highly inflated price. This disastrous position experienced by short sellers is known 
as a short squeeze. In fact Daniel Drew loved to say, He who sells what isnt his must 
buy it back or go to prison. 
 The twentieth century saw both an increase in the size of the market and the 
market regulations which made manipulations and cornering a stock more difficult. 
Although most investors would still act mostly on rumors due to little available 
information, this era marked the birth of investors who practiced market and technical 
analysis. For example, Bernard Baruch shorted Amalgamated Cooper Company in 1901 
when the company attempted to monopolize the copper market, driving the competition 
away, and driving up the prices. However, Baruch believed that higher prices would lead 
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to lower demand and the companys attempt to corner the market would be unsuccessful. 
He was right and he made seven hundred thousand dollars from the trade. Meanwhile, 
Jesse Livermore, who at age 14 got a job at Paine Webber in 1901 posting stock prices on 
a chalk board, had incredible math skills and a photographic memory to remember all the 
historic movements of the stock he followed. He used his ability to identify profitable 
trading patterns which is known today as technical analysis. Livermore had no preference 
between buying long or shorting a stock as long as he made money. One of his famous 
investing quotes was: There is only one side to the stock market; and it is not the bull 
side or the bear side but the right side. History recorded that some of his most successful 
trades were short sales. In the stock market crash in 1907, he made a handsome three 
million dollars and in the crash of 1929, some estimated he made as much as 100 million 
dollars.  
As history repeated itself, again, many believed that short sellers, including 
Livermore, caused the market crashes including the 1929 crash that led to the Great 
Depression. Livermore received multiple death threats from people who blamed him for 
their losses. 22 Following the crash, Congress drafted section 10(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 which gave the Securities and Exchange Commission powers to 
regulate short selling. When the stock market plunged again in 1937, the SEC created the 
up-tick rule under clause 10(a)-1 which is fundamentally unchanged until today. The 
SEC feared that short selling could result in unwarranted downward pressure on a stock 
                                                
22 Ironically, though, short selling actually was light during the late 1920s compared to the 
previous decades. In November 1929, the NYSE reported that around one hundredth of one percent of 
outstanding shares had been sold short. Perceptive investors had learned that shorting stocks when the 
market was booming was a quick way to lose money. Further study of large block sales identified the 
liquidation of long positions as the main cause of market weakness.  
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price and believed that the problem would be circumvented if a short sale is only allowed 
when the price is up.  
Short Selling by Pooled Capital Managers 
 The initial practice of pooling capital to invest in the U.S. capital market started in 
the 1920s bull market. One of the most well-known organizers of pooled capital was 
William Durant, who was also the founder of General Motors. Using his large amount of 
capital, Durant amassed the power to move and to manipulate the market. This power 
was no longer attainable using individual capital as the size of the market grew 
tremendously. In 1949, Alfred Winslow Jones established the first hedge fund which 
included short selling in its investment strategy. However, shorting by hedge funds 
dissipated in the 1960s and early 1970s because of the bullish stock market. It was not 
until the 1980s that hedge funds reemerged. One of the top hedge fund managers during 
this period was George Soros who shorted Avon, a famous brand-name stock, when it 
was trading at 120 dollar per share. His analysis showed that the population was getting 
older; therefore, demand for Avons products would start to tumble. Avons shares fell to 
20 dollar per share in two years and Soros made about 1 million dollars on the trade. 
There are other prominent hedge fund managers who made good returns from shorting 
stocks through good analysis, among others, Michael Steinhardt. He made millions of 
dollars by shorting overvalued companies and he even targeted mega companies such as 
GE, Coca Cola, and McDonalds. 
 The 1980s also saw the emergence of a new breed of pooled capital management 
that is the short-only funds. Unlike the hedge funds which maintain portfolios with both 
long and short positions, short-only funds specialize only on short sales. The Feshbach 
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brothers managed one of the first short-only funds in 1982 and they specialized in 
targeting firms committing fraud. One of their greatest successes was when they shorted 
ZZZZ Best, a carpet-cleaning company founded by Barry Minkow. They conducted a 
tremendous amount of analysis on the company, including calling customers, suppliers, 
and competitors, and concluded that the company was announcing bogus contracts. Soon 
afterwards, the company filed bankruptcy and Minkow was convicted of securities fraud. 
Although small in number, the short-only funds made sensational returns from the mid-
80s to 1990. The short-only funds, however, dwindled during the protracted bull market 
in the 1990s.  
 Recently, some short-only funds have made a comeback. One of the most famous 
one is Kynikos Associates which is managed by George Chanos. Although he lost a 
substantial amount of money shorting internet stocks in the 1990s; he was successful in 
shorting companies such as Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. Chanos carried out thorough 
analysis of these companies financial statements. In his testimony in front of the 
Congress about Enron, he revealed that he was deeply suspicious of the companys 
revenue recognition process and cryptic footnotes describing related party transactions. 
Collecting further information, both financial and non-financial, he shorted Enron heavily 
before the stock took a tailspin and finally ended-up worthless.      
Short Selling and Efficient Markets 
 Short selling is important to the market because it helps market liquidity and 
pricing efficiency. The SEC acknowledged the role short sellers play in the equities 
markets in the following excerpt from the Concept Release on Short Selling in (SEC 
1997): 
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Substantial market liquidity is provided through short selling short selling 
adds to the trading supply of stock available to purchasers and reduces the risk 
that the price paid by investors is artificially high because of a temporary 
contraction of supply. Short selling also contributes to the pricing efficiency 
of the equities markets. When a short seller speculates on a downward 
movement in a security, his transaction is a mirror image of the person who 
purchases the security based upon speculation that the securitys price will 
rise Market participants who believe a stock is overvalued may engage in 
short sales in an attempt to profit from a perceived divergence of prices from 
true economic values. Such short sellers add to stock pricing efficiency 
because their transactions inform the market of their evaluation of future stock 
price performance. This evaluation is reflected in the resulting market price of 
the security.23 
 
 Proponents of short selling have stated that short sellers perform better 
fundamental analysis then the bulls. Short sellers are skeptical and they perform thorough 
analysis of facts rather than relying on management stories and projections. There is 
evidence that short sellers forensic works exposed manipulations and frauds; thus, 
bringing prices back in line with true economic values. In a 1997 Concept Release on 
Short Selling, the SEC sought public comments on the regulation of short sales of 
securities. The SEC invited inputs on, among others, providing exceptions for actively 
traded securities to eliminating short selling regulations altogether. Yet, there has been no 
decision on the implementation of new short selling rules. 
 Despite short sellers contribution to market efficiency, short sellers remained 
deeply misunderstood and have been blamed during every major downturn. Complaints 
against short sellers continue from the early equity markets in Europe until today. During 
the Asia crises in 1997 and 1998, Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammad of Malaysia 
banned short selling of companies in the Kuala Lumpur index, accusing a Jewish 
conspiracy led by George Soros to re-colonize his country. In 2001, lawmakers in the 
                                                
23 SEC Concept Release: Short Sales. Release No. 34-42037; File S7-24-99. 
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US asked the SEC to consider a temporary ban on short selling shortly after the 911- 
tragedy.   
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